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Introduction

43
It is usually assumed that the interaction between the economics and politics is dysfunctional in developing countries. 44 Why does it seem such a stable situation? Since the early 1990s, both mainstream and other economists have addressed 45 the issue with renewed calls for a more thorough approach to studying the role of states and institutions in market econo- 46 mies. Transition in Eastern Europe and the experience of high growth and crises in emerging economies played a key role in 47 rekindling these debates. Still, the field is marred with serious research shortcomings, the most conspicuous of which is the 48 difficulty of accounting for state action and for the role of the legal regime in promoting a dynamic economy. The role of the 49 state as builder and maintainer of the economic infrastructure is widely acknowledged by most economists. At the same 50 time, the transition from a state manipulated by a rent-seeking elite to an organization providing the framework for an effi-51 cient market economy remains a puzzle. As indicated by the debates around the notions of ''legal origin" and ''legal trans- 52 plants", the mechanisms by which some legal principles would favor growth and the process by which they could be 53 implemented are open questions. 54 This paper argues that development is conditioned by a parallel and interacting development of the rule of law, whose 55 central features are the formalization and hierarchization of norms within a consistent framework, and public bureaucracy, 56 which is characterized by independence and technical capability. Together they guarantee the credibility and evolutivity of 57 the social pact as well as the implementation of an institutional framework favoring division of labor, collective action, and 58 innovation. Pascal observed that ''Justice without force is powerless; force without justice is tyrannical" (Pensée #103). Like- 59 wise, we argue that legal formalization is key to economics and political integration: legal norms are necessary to grant legit- 60 imacy and to control the coercive capability of the state; and a skilled and neutral bureaucracy is required to provide access 61 to public goods and ensure the transforming of de jure rights granted to citizens into de facto rights that can be opposed 62 against others. 63 In order to analyze the process of state building and legal evolution, this paper builds on the notion of constitutionaliza-64 tion. Rather than viewing rights as being established once (under conditions that are often unique) or being the corollary 65 outcome of an external dynamic, we envisage rights-both political and economic-as the product of an ongoing bargaining 66 process. Rights are debated, fought over, supported, and possibly renegotiated by unequal (though purposeful) agents who 67 interact with their rulers. 68 In particular, we consider the vertical delegation of authority by individuals to political rulers. This delegation aims to 69 provide the ruler(s) with the capability to establish both the fundamental rights of individuals and the basic rules of social 70 exchange in a given society. The problem with rulers is that, once endowed with considerable power, they may trample on 71 the individual and property rights of their subjects. We contrast two types of constitutional delegations. Under a liberal re-72 gime, the governed are able to establish strong guarantees. The recognition of extended and equal fundamental rights to all- 73 combined with a balance of power in the organization of the relationship among authorities-binds the rulers to the gov-74 erned. In order to maintain their leadership position, rulers must please the governed by efficiently providing them with 75 the public goods they need. Yet in the absence of strong guarantees, rulers are likely to bargain with different groups in soci-76 ety to guarantee them specific (and thus unequal) rights. The result is a sustainable coalition in which various individuals 77 and groups obtain rents. In this context, which in our framework is defined as a despotic constitution, the governed are un-78 able to credibly balance the power of those benefiting from a constitutional delegation. In response, the governed tend to 79 grant delegations to several rulers in charge of different dimensions of collective coordination-typically local communities, 80 professional guilds, or warlords. This way of challenging the power of rulers allows the population to limit capture, but it 81 leads to inefficiencies in collective coordination and in the provision of public goods. First of all, authorities are not likely 82 to operate at the prope scale. Second, competition among rulers can hinder their capacity to provide order and may even 83 result in (possibly violent) conflict. 84 Starting from this, we show that there is an intrinsic dynamic of constitutionalization processes by which citizens-who 85 may have been granted unequal fundamental rights at a particular historical moment-call for an extension and equalization 86 of their rights, which in turn leads to the emergence of liberal orders characterized by strong equality of rights. This promotes 87 competition, facilitates innovation, and boosts participation in collective action, thereby promoting economic and civic devel-88 opment. The main driver of this evolution is the ''call" of the governed for adjustments to the existing constitutional arrange-89 ment so that they can reap the benefits of wealth and autonomy from their increased capacities. However, there are two problems with this approach. First is an overemphasis on discontinuity in political and economic Our focus on legal bargaining sets us against those who define an illiberal order by the complete absence of rights for the 152 population (e.g., Olson, 1993) . Such writers typically build on a purely oppressive interpretation of Hobbes's Leviathan: first, 153 people accepted peaceful oppression as preferable to anarchy and endemic violence, but then they discovered that the sov-154 ereign could not be controlled. Once the birth of a state is set in such terms, it is hard to see why a well-established, powerful 155 despot or oligarchy would be willing to sign off its privileges. This is a common theme in much of the contemporary literature in political economy, whose perspective differs little from that of Karl Marx-and the subsequent critical tradi- tance of the state's transformation from an organization captured by the elite to one that is independent and impersonal. 190 The rise of a procedural (public) bureaucracy à la Weber is the issue here. 191 Bureaucracies and the actions of bureaucrats are severely framed to guarantee impersonal application of formal rules 192 (Weber, 1922 (Weber, /1978 Merton, 1940; Wilson, 1989) . Key structural elements of bureaucracies-such as transparency in divi-193 sion of administrative duties, appointment according to objective technical qualifications, long-term careers with merit-194 based promotions (Evans and Rauch, 1999), incentives for conformity to norms of professionalism (Tirole, 1994) , and so 195 forth-combine to implement the constitutional pact. First, as mentioned by many scholars (e.g., North, 1981; Wilson, 196 1989; Barro, 1991; Nee, 2000) , bureaucracies provide a set of public goods corresponding to the citizens' rights. Second why they are more efficient than code-based legal systems. Hadfield (2008) points out that these contrasts are misplaced. In our view, the process of legalization is cumulative in both cases: either through judicial or political confrontations-and on the basis of controversies based on precedents or doctrinal debates-economic and civic agents will continue to renegotiate the boundaries and the extension of their rights in any legal system. 2.6. Interactions between formal and informal norms 216 We focus mainly on the rise of formal norms, but we also recognize the interplay between the formal and informal order. 217 Social actors play a part in both orders, and it is the tension between the two that calls for resolution. Because formal norms 218 are less ambiguous and are amendable to wider social enforceability (i.e., beyond community boundaries), they seem to an- To better understand the economics and politics of transition to a liberal order, we propose an analytical framework 227 based on the idea that any order relies on a delegation contract between individuals and an entity that becomes an order 228 provider (see Section 3.1). We show how contrasted abilities in implementing self-enforcing safeguards to protect the gov-229 erned explain differences in the success of establishing a collective order (Section 3.2). ''Extended" delegations provide the 230 public regulator with the legitimacy to define the collective interest and to arbitrate between private interests (Section 3.3). 231 However, public regulators are granted different levels of recognized legitimacy (and resulting authority), depending on the 232 guarantees provided to the governed. 4 Hence we compare different types of constitutions-in particular, despotic versus liberal 233 ones (Section 3.4). We show that liberal constitutions generate a virtuous growth-and-legitimacy loop at the root of economic 234 development and growth (Section 3.5). 235 3.1. Delegation at the roots of order-providing entities 236 We consider individuals who recognize their collective coordination needs and who therefore decide to delegate 5 the 237 rights to establish collective order to an individual, such as a sovereign, or to a group either spontaneously settled (e.g., a com-238 munity) or formally established (e.g., an organization). 6 What matters is that individuals grant this entity the rights to estab-239 lish order. Order results from agreement on rules-that is, rights to take action and to access or use resources-and from 240 enforcement to guarantee compliance. A cost-benefit analysis can be applied to alternative ways of producing order (Barzel, 241 1989; North, 1990; Williamson, 1996) . By agreeing to limit their ex post freedom of action, individuals might lose opportunities 242 to adopt first-best behavior in certain circumstances; they might also be required to contribute to the production of collective 243 services. Finally, there is the risk of rents being captured by the order provider. Agents compare the costs and relational hazards 4 It must be clear that delegating individuals are the principals; the rulers being their agents. However, in the common language individual-citizens are often qualified as agents, while the rulers might be named as principals. To avoid confusion, citizens will not be referred as principals in the following, and rulers will not be qualified as agents. 5 Delegation can be explicit or implicit. In this paper we consider that delegation is in essence ''an act", even if there is not always a formal and explicit act of delegation. We acknowledge the historical fact that individuals are born into established orders. Yet they may then decide whether or not to opt out, toadhere to other complementary or substitute orders, or to create new orders. Delegation is therefore about the de facto mutual recognition of rights and duties between a ruler and the governed. Its implementation leads to de facto renegotiation between the two parties because there may be varying degrees of compliance with the agreement between them. 6 Orders can be formal or informal. A formal order is based on an identified principal to whom agents, either explicitly or implicitly, delegate authority. An informal order is based on the convergence of individual expectations regarding who (e.g., what leader or community) should rule and ensure compliance (Aoki, 2001; Dixit, 2004 . In this paper we focus on formal orders.
Q5 244 just described with the benefits of being ruled. Fundamental benefits of delegating authority are solving problems of collective 245 action in the provision of public goods; this includes the resources (e.g., a common language and monetary system, fraud avoid- 246 ance mechanisms, quality assessment solutions) that facilitate bilateral deals and trade. If agents had to provide the correspond-247 ing collective services themselves or by contracting, then either the services would be more costly or externalities would 248 prevent their production at an efficient level. 249 The logic of this delegation of authority to a ruler is collective. Individuals waiving their discretion to a ruler do so jointly 250 because this is one way to form a coalition. The ruler becomes a mutual guarantor among those who accept being subordi-251 nate to her. In addition, she becomes an aggregator of individual means of coercion; this allows her to threaten any individ-252 ual including those who do not delegate authority to her. Indeed, she is able to aggregate resources (physical strength, 253 money, and/or knowledge) so as to allow and rationalize collective action. Delegation thus leads to the recognition of rights 254 that can be opposable among individuals, since the ruler can force the compliance of both insiders and outsiders. Of course, 255 there may be limits to this capacity. The choice between a targeted and an extended delegation depends on the trade-off just described and on individuals' 279 needs. Extended delegation is granted to guarantee rights that are viewed as essential 8 and therefore expects those rights 280 to be firmly established. To maintain the cohesion of agents concerning any joint delegation, the ruler must take into account the interests of all 283 her stakeholders and guarantee each of them a ''fair" return on his delegation. Otherwise, individual agents will leave the 284 coalition or (if it is too costly to leave) break the order. The ruler is therefore required to provide collective services that en-285 sure an acceptable cost-benefit ratio to each of the delegating agents. 286 In that perspective, there is a substantial difference between the ''public" ruler who benefits from an extended delegation 287 and the ''private" ruler who benefits from a targeted one. Indeed, the latter need only consider the narrow purpose she 7 From the viewpoint of governed, avoiding coalition among the divided rulers is obviously essential. In unorganized systems of division of power, they are on the one hand impossible to prevent. On the other hand, they tend to be unstable. Let us contrast two cases. If rulers are unequal in rights or strength, the inequality yield strong competition among them. There are always rulers challenging the ''despot", or attempting to bypass her unequal coalition pact; thus opening margins of discretion for the citizens. If rulers are equal, forming a stable coalition among them is very unlikely since, as in cartels, there are incentives to shirk and only very narrow possibilities to implement a self-enforceable mutual commitment among rulers. In organized systems of power, the vertical and horizontal division of power, as well as the development of specific mechanisms of appointment aimed at insulating from each other the various holders of legitimacy to rule (and additionally to make them accountable toward the citizens) precisely aims at avoiding the forming of stable coalitions. As pointed out in Section 4, however, preventing the stability of coalition among rulers is not the all point because once rights are well constitutionalized-both because they are strongly established by the legal order and embodied in the social division of labor (and therefore in assets and in the human capital)-rulers can hardly tamper them; which is one of the central argument in this paper. 8 It is important to remember that the notion of fundamental rights is subjective, dynamic, and endogenous. Individuals have endless needs, and any public regulator is likely to increase the level of its provision of rights and associated services simply to reinforce the justification for an extended delegation of authority in its favor (more on this in the next section).
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serves. Individuals join to delegate because they share a common specific interest in being provided with a single good. The 289 ruler can easily aggregate costs and benefits of the alternative way of providing the good. In contrast, extended delegation 290 covers many domains and thus deals with preferences of individuals concerning very different goods and services, which are 291 difficult to measure in terms of a common currency. Yet the public ruler will need to do more than reconcile conflicting inter-292 ests 9 ; she will have to ''build" the collective interest. Individual preferences are nonaggregative-because the loss of (subjec- In the case of public orders, this results in inequality of actual rights between those favored by the rulers and other mem-318 bers of the society. Even though they may constitute the vast majority of the population, these ''outsiders" may be exposed to 319 various forms of discrimination with respect to taxation, market access, public infrastructure, protection of property rights, 320 physical security, and so forth. A good example is the informal sector at the margins of large conurbations in present-day 321 developing countries. 322 Under a liberal constitution, inequalities in rights between the rulers and the governed tend to be minimized, whereas 323 such inequalities are huge under a despotic constitution. In a despotic regime, the governed are unable to secure credible 324 safeguards from the public ruler. Hence they limit as much as possible the scope of delegation by recognizing the ruler's 325 authority in only a few domains. Because this limits the sovereign's ability to provide public goods, subjects rely on local 326 solidarities (e.g., family, lineage, ethnicity, guilds, municipal communities, gangs) to ensure the provision of most of 327 them-though with little advantage in terms of size, scope, or specialization. Despite these inefficiencies, the constitutional 328 arrangement may be quite stable. Individuals stand by their communal solidarities, which protect them against the despotic 329 ruler; in turn, the constitutional pact is prevented from extending beyond its initial, minimal contract. rights result in the provision of public goods. Since these benefit all citizens, the formation of a majority coalition supporting 9 This is even more complex because the need for an extended delegation is a function of the potential conflict of claims among the members of a population.
Indeed, the more conflicting claims over resources or mutual rights and duties, the more a mutual guarantor is required. 10 The notion of a ''despotic regime" is somewhat dated and possibly Eurocentric. Starting with Montesquieu, despots have often been implicitly or explicitly oriental, non-Christian, and arbitrary-an intellectual legacy still present in the Weberian notion of a ''sultanic regime". Others might prefer to contrast ''liberal" with some other antonym, but we prefer ''despotic" because it clearly includes both economic and political dimensions and, we assume, it can fairly be applied to both antique and contemporary experiences, Western and non-Western alike. 11 Brousseau and Raynaud (forthcoming) assume that agents are ex ante heterogeneous in the sense just described. Therefore, when common orders are being designed and adopted, norm setters or institutional entrepreneurs compete to coordinate agents or support collective action: they promote alternative solutions for a given coordination problem in a given community (e.g., by supporting market exchange or the production of public goods). Hence, the resulting order primarily reflects the preferences and needs of the winning party. Although every agent can expect to benefit from reduced transaction costs, the needs of core members of the groups designing and implementing the collective governance solutions will be better addressed than those of ''fringe" agents. Indeed the latter will incur coordination costs that are higher than their first-best.
the extension of these rights (and attendant benefits) is understandable. 12 Second, to accommodate the plurality of interests 334 that have equal legitimacy in a liberal regime, it is essential to formalize and manage mechanisms permitting all interests to be 335 voiced. 13 As a result, collective decision principles tend to rely on the majority preference. The socio-economic and the civic 336 logics combine to establish an open-ended dynamic: as the demands for public good from a larger share of the population 337 are better addressed and as the benefits of scale, scope, and specialization are better exploited on the supply side, the rulers 338 benefit from increasing legitimacy and fiscal resources. This ''legitimacy loop" enables the governing elite to derive private ben-339 efits from the high-powered delegations granted by the other tiers of society. 340 In a despotic regime, the contract between rulers and principals is narrower and much less dynamic. Since a large part of 341 the population does not benefit from significant rights and since the voicing of objections is limited, it follows that the com-342 mon interest is reduced: typically it amounts to security for all and a reduced package of services for the happy few. Given 343 the reduced supply of public goods and services, no ''legitimacy loop" can develop; moreover, the pool of resources from 344 which rulers can draw rents remains much smaller than in a liberal regime. constitutional game: as underlying conditions and needs evolve, market infrastructure and nonmarket common goods may 12 The only limit to the extension of fundamental rights is the cost of the resulting services, which might exceed the willingness of influential coalitions to contribute to the common good. Resources conceded to the state may reach an equilibrium that reflects the relative concern in each society for market incentives versus collective solidarity (under conditions of declining marginal returns of public good provision). 13 Negotiation costs and delays preclude unanimity, so collective choices must be based on a mechanism that combines majority rule with freedom of expression. 385 be better governed. Collective learning also facilitates improvements in social technologies toward the end of better man-386 aging collective action or better dealing with specific individual or community needs. Table 2 summarizes Our contractual approach to social order does not rely on a social contract perspective whereby ex ante free and skilled 399 individuals negotiate a constitutional pact according to the distribution of bargaining power and the nature of their prefer- ences. Instead, we consider historical processes of constitutionalization by which members of the society, ex ante embedded 401 in family and community structures, are progressively enfranchised by a ruler's recognition of individual rights. 402 In any actual order, some individuals are restricted in their capacity to access resources or in their right to live their lives 403 as they would wish. Hence these agents have incentive to shirk vis-à-vis the existing set of rules or to call for the evolution of 404 those rules, which results in bargaining. Bargaining can be implicit in the sense that a ruler may choose not to punish indi-405 viduals who fail to comply with established rules. The ruler weighs the costs and benefits of enforcing the existing order 406 against those associated with the amendments called for by dissident individuals and groups. Explicit or implicit bargaining 407 results in a de facto mutual recognition of rights and authority. 408 When calling for an extension and strengthening of their individual rights, the governed are driven by two types of moti-409 vation: economic and civic. Economic agents call for security of property rights; freedom to contract (and to create organi-410 zations); and, more generally, open access to potential counterparts in the exchange although some individuals would prefer 411 that their markets be isolated from competition). Civic motivations are based on recognizing that allegiance to a ruler gen-412 erates not only collective solidarities but also dependencies that should be addressed. Rights to oversight and to reconsider 413 or object to delegation prevent expropriation and make it possible to influence the production of public goods. 414 The call for more rights is not just a question of enfranchisement; it is also a question of empowerment and possibly of 415 ethics. Rights are indeed understood as leading to the collective provision of services that either compensate for the destruc-416 tion of traditional structures (e.g., a social ''safety net" in place of families or clan solidarities) or allow one to benefit from-or 417 at least to manage-the consequences of more freedom (typically via education). Empowering rights are the enabling con-418 dition for, and thus the counterpart of, increased complexity in social exchanges and increased interdependencies among 419 individuals due to the deepening division of labor. Citizens might also call for an equalization of these extended sets of 420 rights-motivated either by altruism or by a selfish ethic justified by the ''veil of ignorance". 421 Facing the governed, the rulers have a vested interest in defending their prerogatives. While the governed can be expected 422 to resist, they will compromise for two reasons. First, the resulting economic dynamic might well lead to an increase in their 423 individual wealth (while the rulers' share decreases, and the contestability of their position increases). Second, rulers require 424 the continuation of their legitimacy in order to govern and regulate. If they cannot establish terror (or if recourse to violence 425 is counterproductive) then rulers must make concessions, especially if the governed have exit options or are able to unite. 426 There are, as well, two factors that hinder the dynamics of equalization and the extension of rights. The first factor is redis-427 tribution effects. All kinds of individual rents are suppressed with the equalization of rights and the rise of competition. 428 Although increasing the surplus theoretically allows winners to compensate losers, the latter might still fear net losses. 429 And even though the consequences of uncertainty have become increasingly socialized, uncertainty persists because com- forthcoming). 450 We have remarked that the rule of law develops in two contrasting yet interconnected domains. First, the constitutional 451 delegation between rulers and the governed must be made explicit. Under a despotic constitution, the notion of public inter-452 est is unclear, as are the duties of the sovereign toward her subjects. On the other hand, a liberal order requires not only the 453 enactment of a formal constitution and Bill of Rights but also the emergence of a legal and jurisdictional hierarchy, headed by 454 a supreme court, that is responsible for defending the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the ruler and also for nondiscrimination 455 among citizens-in short, a judiciary oversighting of any infranational level of regulation and the settlement of jurisdictional 456 conflicts. Beyond this organization of federalism and the public-private hierarchy, the second domain of a developing rule of 457 law is in the implementation of a division of power à la Montesquieu-especially to manage the enactment of new rights and 517 or club). Second, the state provides goods and services whose characteristics make it difficult to organize competition among 518 producers. Third, solvency norms and contractual commitments cannot exercise hard budget constraints comparable to 519 those supported by private agents. As a consequence, the potential for capture, rent-seeking, and resource dissipation is 520 intrinsic to all states. Such phenomena are not second-order institutional failures; rather, they are an integral part of the con-521 stitutional bargain between rulers and the governed. This is one reason why states around the world differ as much in their 522 present structure as in their capacity to address and redress this pattern. 14 A process is irrevocable if it is no longer possible to go back from a given state to any previous one. In contrast, with an irreversible process it is possible to return to a previous state-but just not by the reverse path.
